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Abstract—Recent research advances have revealed the com-
putational secrecy of the compressed sensing (CS) paradigm.
Perfect secrecy can also be achieved by normalizing the CS mea-
surement vector. However, these findings are established on real
measurements while digital devices can only store measurements
at a finite precision. Based on the distribution of measurements
of natural images sensed by structurally random ensemble, a
joint quantization and diffusion approach is proposed for these
real-valued measurements. In this way, a nonlinear cryptographic
diffusion is intrinsically imposed on the CS process and the overall
security level is thus enhanced. Security analyses show that the
proposed scheme is able to resist known-plaintext attack while the
original CS scheme without quantization cannot. Experimental
results demonstrate that the reconstruction quality of our scheme
is comparable to that of the original one.
Keywords—compressed sensing, quantization, image encryption,
diffusion, structurally random matrices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compressed sensing (CS) has received much research
attention in the past decade [1]–[3] since it samples a sparse
signal at a rate lower than that required by the traditional sam-
pling theorem. For a signal x which can be represented by k
out of N significant components under a certain transformation
Ψ, the CS theory states that x can be faithfully recovered from
its compressive sampled linear measurements y = Φ ·x under
the condition that the sensing matrix A = Φ ·Ψ satisfies the
restricted isometry property (RIP) [4].
In the CS process, Gaussian or Bernoulli matrices are
commonly employed as the measurement matrix due to their
universality and optimal measurement performance. When CS
is used to sample natural images, new issues, such as fast
computation and efficient storage, arise. Structurally random
matrices (SRM) are potential candidates to meet these new
requirements [5]. In general, CS employing SRM can be
formulated as
Φ =
√
N
M
DFR, (1)
where R is either a random permutation matrix or a diagonal
matrix whose diagonal elements are independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) Bernoulli variables, F is an orthogonal
matrix which can be chosen from fast transformations such
as DFT, DCT or WHT, and D is a down sampling operator
which selects M measurements out of N ones uniformly. For
the purpose of efficient storage, F can be in the form of a
block diagonal matrix, i.e.,
F =


Fb 0 . . . 0
0 Fb . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . Fb

 , (2)
where Fb is an orthogonal matrix of size B×B. In summary,
the compressed sensing process using SRM can be carried out
in three steps: pre-randomization of the signal to be sensed;
orthogonal transformation and down sampling.
When the measurement matrix Φ is treated as a secret key,
it is reported in [6] that unauthorized users cannot decode the
measurement vector because they do not know which random
subspace the measurement vector is expressed. Thus CS can be
considered as possessing the property of a symmetric cipher.
Rachlin et al. proved that breaking a CS-based cipher by
systematically searching in the key space is computational
infeasible [7]. This finding was later extended to Shannon’s
perfect secrecy by Bianchi et al. through normalizing the
ciphertext [8].
However, the application of these findings in practical
scenarios is hampered since a) CS-based ciphers require one-
time-pad keys which lead to key delivery and management
problems; b) the achieved secrecy is based on real-valued
measurements but digital devices can only store finite-precision
numbers. These motivate us to investigate the security char-
acteristics of CS with quantized measurements. Making use
of the distribution of measurements of natural images, we
suggest quantizing the measurement vector to integers in the
interval [0, 255] using a first-order Σ∆ quantizer [9]. The
similarities between error feedback mechanism of the quantizer
and cryptographic diffusion primitive inspire us to design a
joint quantization and diffusion approach for the measurement
vector. With the intrinsic diffusion property, the resistance
to known-plaintext attack (KPA) of CS-based cipher is thus
improved. Simulation results justify that the reconstruction
quality of the proposed approach is comparable to the original
CS without quantization. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first study of embedding security measures in the
quantization process of CS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II is an
introduction of our joint quantization and diffusion approach
for CS measurements. Sec. III presents a secure and fast CS
scheme for natural images based on the proposed approach.
Security analyses and simulation results can be found in
Sec. IV while other possible applications of the proposed
scheme are discussed in Sec. V. The last section concludes
our work.
II. A JOINT QUANTIZATION AND DIFFUSION APPROACH
FOR MEASUREMENTS OF NATURAL IMAGES
As observed from Eqs. (1) and (2), each measurement
can be considered as a weighted sum of B random pixels.
According to the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), the samples
follow the Gaussian distribution asymptotically. To explain this
phenomenon in more detail, we carry out some experiments
using different block sizes and orthogonal transformations.
Fig. 1 is a plot of the quantities of input samples vs that of
standard normal, using Lena as the test image. It shows that the
measurements obtained by sensing a natural image using the
structurally random DCT matrix behave like Gaussian random
variables. More simulations have been performed to sample
other test images using different transform matrices and block
sizes. The distributions of the measurements are depicted in
Figs. 2(a)-(d).
Fig. 1. QQ plot of measurements obtained using structurally random DCT
matrix with block size B = 32 and sampling rate SR = M/N = 0.5. The
test image is 256× 256 Lena image.
Inspired by the 3-sigma rule of Gaussian variables, i.e.,
about 99.7% of values drawn from a Gaussian distribution are
within three standard deviations from the mean, we propose to
quantize these measurements to the range [0, 255] using a first-
order Σ∆ quantizer. The quantization process can be expressed
as
qi = Q(ui−1 + yi), (3)
ui =
{
(ui−1 + yi)− qi if 0 < qi < 255,
ui−1 otherwise, (4)
where u0 is the initial quantization error, q = {qi}Mi=1 is the
quantized output of the measurement vector y = {yi}Mi=1 and
Q(·) is a 8-bit quantizer governed by
Q(a) =
{
round(a) + 127 if − 127.5 ≤ a < 128.5,
0 if a < −127.5,
255 if a ≥ 128.5,
where round(a) returns the nearest integer of a.
From the above description, it is easy to find that the
quantization error at the i-th step is updated by the error
at the previous step using Eq. (4). This updated error will
influence the quantization process of the next element yi+1
of the measurement vector, as governed by Eq. (3). In this
way, the i-th quantized value qi is affected by the initial error
u0 through an accumulated manner, which possesses certain
intrinsic similarity with the cryptographic diffusion primitive.
Suppose that a key stream V = {vi}Mi=0 has been generated,
a typical diffusion approach using nonlinear modular addition
can be expressed as
q∗i = qi ∔ vi ∔ q
∗
i−1, (5)
where q∗0 = v0 is the initial value and a∔b = (a+b) mod 256.
With the help of the value q∗i−1 and the key stream, the i-th
quantized measurement qi can be decrypted by the following
reverse operations:
qi = q
∗
i
.− vi
.− q∗i−1, (6)
where a .− b = (a − b + 256) mod 256. As a result, a joint
quantization and diffusion approach for the CS measurements
can be derived from Eqs. (3), (4), (5) and (6). The process can
be expressed as
q∗i = Q(ui−1 + yi)∔ vi ∔ q
∗
i−1,
ui =
{
(ui−1 + yi)− qi if 0 < qi < 255,
ui−1 otherwise,
It should be noticed that q∗i has a uniform distribution rather
than a Guassian one, as caused by the randomness of the key
stream {vi}Mi=0. Moreover, the quantization error made in the
previous step still accounts for the quantization of the next
measurement. Thus, all the advantages of the original Σ∆
quantization method [9] are reserved.
III. FAST COMPRESSED SENSING OF NATURAL IMAGES
WITH SECRECY
Before describing the details of a fast CS scheme with
secrecy for natural images, we first address the problems of
constructing the permutation matrix R and the down sam-
pling operator D to form the SRM as well as generating
the key stream V for quantization and diffusion. Without
loss of generality, we assume that a cryptographic random
number generator (RNG) which can produce random numbers
uniformly in the interval [1, N ] is available. As stated in [10,
Sec. 5.3], a random permutation sequence {τ(i)}Ni=1 of the set
{1, 2, 3, · · · , N − 1, N} can be generated at a complexity of
O(N) by the following method:
• Step 1. Initialize τ(i) = i for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
• Step 2. Set i = 1.
• Step 3. Generate a random number j ∈ [i, N ] using
the RNG.
• Step 4. Swap τ(i) and τ(j).
• Step 5. If i < N , let i = i + 1 and turn to Step 3;
otherwise, return {τ(i)}Ni=1.
Given a 128-bit secret key K as the seed of the RNG,
two sequences {τ(i)}Ni=1 and {τ(j)}Mj=1 are produced by
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 2. Distribution of measurements obtained from sampling several test images at different settings (SR = 0.8): (a) Cameraman, DCT with block size
B = 32; (b) House, DCT with block size B = 64; (c) Peppers, WHT with block size B = 128; (d) Baboon, DFT with block size B = 256.
running the RNG for (N + M) times from the seed. Then
the permutation matrix R and the down sampling matrix D
are determined by1
ri = (0, 0, · · · , 1τ(i), 0, · · · , 0),
dj = (0, 0, · · · , 1τ(j), 0, · · · , 0),
where i ∈ [1, N ], j ∈ [1,M ], ri and dj denote the i-th row
of R and the j-th row of D, respectively. Similarly, run the
RNG for a further of (M +1) times and produce {τ(k)}M+1k=1 ,
the key stream V = {vi}Mi=0 for diffusing the measurements
is obtained by setting vi = τ(i + 1) mod 256.
Making use of the above notations, the proposed fast CS
method with secrecy for a H × W (N = H ×W ) natural
image P contains the following operation steps:
• Initialization: Construct R, D and V from the key K
as described above, then stretch P to a vector x by
stacking its columns.
• Pre-randomization: Randomize x using the permuta-
tion matrix R.
• Orthogonal Transformation: Apply a chosen fast
transform, such as DCT or DFT, to the output of the
previous step.
• Down Sampling and Normalization: Select M real
measurements y = {yi}Mi=1 out of N ones uniformly
using D and normalize the result.
• Quantization and Diffusion: Apply the joint
quantization and diffusion approach to y with
the help of the key stream V.
The whole scheme can be expressed as
q∗ = QD(Φ · x) = QD(
√
N
M
DFR · x),
where QD(·) is the joint quantization and diffusion operation
described in Sec. II.
To reconstruct the original image P, or equivalently x,
one should first obtain the quantization vector q from the
inverse diffusion equation (6) using the key stream V. Then,
the measurement matrix used for sampling is exactly retrieved
by the decoder using K. Finally, the gradient projection for
sparse reconstruction (GPSR) algorithm [11] is employed to
1When R is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are i.i.d. Bernoulli
variables, we can set ri = (0, 0, · · · , (−1)τ(i) mod 2i , 0, · · · , 0) instead.
tackle the following optimization problem2
min ‖s‖1 subject to ‖q−ΦΨs‖22 < ε, (7)
and an approximate version of x can be determined by xˆ =
Ψ · s.
IV.SECURITY ANALYSES AND NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
A. Known-Plaintext Attack
It is widely recognized that the sensitivity to changes in
plaintext plays a significant role in determining a cipher’s
security level, especially its resistance to plaintext attacks. The
encryption process of a CS-based cipher without quantization
is based on random projection, which is linear. Therefore, it
is not surprise that the ciphertexts or measurements are not
sensitive to the changes in plaintext. Based on this observation,
an attacker can carry out known-plaintext attack on the non-
quantized CS, which can be expressed as
y = Φ · x = ΦΨ · s.
The procedures of the attack are described as follows:
• Check whether n >> N , where n denotes the number
of known plaintext and ciphertext pairs the attacker
possesses.
• Randomly choose a natural image Pj whose vector-
ized version xj is linearly independent of all the j−1
existing known plain-images.
• Collect all the selected known-images and the corre-
sponding ciphertexts if j = N . Then denote X =
[x1,x2, · · · ,xN ] and Y = [y1,y2, · · · ,yN ].
Now, it is clear that rank(X) = N and an approximate version
of Φ can be obtained by Φˆ = Y ·X−1.
In the CS process employing our joint quantization and
diffusion, the original ciphertext y, which is linearly dependent
on the plain-image, is converted to a quantized and diffused
vector q∗, which is uniformly distributed in [0, 255]. Thus, the
linear relationship between the plain-image and the ciphertext
is disturbed and the KPA attack described above becomes
ineffective.
B. Reconstruction
Different from the uniform quantization proposed in [12],
we map the measurements whose values are outside the
2A simple trick is employed to handle the saturated quantized
measurements. We will introduce it in Sec. IV-B.
interval (−127.5, 128.5] to 0 or 255, as described in Sec. II.
Taking this effect into consideration, we simply reject both the
positively and the negatively saturated measurements during
reconstruction. In this way, the optimization problem (7)
becomes
min ‖s‖1 subject to ‖q−Φ′Ψs‖22 < ε,
where Φ′ is composed of all the rows of Φ with quantized
measurements qi satisfying 0 < qi < 255.
The performance of the joint quantization and diffusion
approach for CS measurements is depicted in Fig. 3, where
the 256 × 256 Lena image is compressively sampled by the
block DCT matrix at a block size B = 32. The benchmark
for comparison is non-quantized CS using SRM under the
same setting [5]. It is clear in Fig. 3 that the performance gap
between the quantized and the non-quantized CS is acceptable
and the average loss in peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) due
to quantization is around 0.6dB.
Fig. 3. Reconstruction performance of the quantized and the non-quantized
CS using SRM.
V. EXTENSION TO OTHER APPLICATIONS
We have studied the security characteristics of the proposed
CS process with quantization by treating it as a symmetric
cipher. Its feasibility for compressing encrypted images in
secure signal processing application [13], [14] will be explored
here.
As shown in Fig. 4, a plain-image x is pre-randomized
with R, which can be regarded as a weak or lightweight
encryption of x performed by a user with limited computing
power. Then a service provider performs the transformation,
down sampling and joint quantization and diffusion processes
on the ciphertext x′ sequentially. Referring to Sec. II, it is easy
to conclude that the compression ratio (CR) is exactly equal to
SR. Finally, authorized users can perform joint decompression
and decryption on the quantized and diffused measurement
vector q∗ to reconstruct an approximated version of x.
VI.CONCLUSIONS
A joint quantization and diffusion approach has been pro-
posed for the block compressed sensing of natural images. To
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Fig. 4. A block diagram showing the flow of compressing an encrypted
image.
realize the goal of fast compressed image sensing with secrecy,
structurally random matrix is employed for fast computation
and the obtained measurements are concealed by the proposed
joint quantization and diffusion mechanism. Theoretical anal-
yses and experimental results have demonstrated that the new
scheme can resist known-plaintext attack and its reconstruction
quality is comparable to that of CS without quantization. Our
approach can be extended to compress encrypted images.
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